wiz · Crawled Jul 17, 2026

M-Red-Team: AsyncAPI Supply Chain Compromise via GitHub Actions

16 IoCs
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AI Summary

In July 2026, an attacker exploited a misconfigured GitHub Actions workflow in the AsyncAPI generator repository using a 'pwn request' technique to steal a privileged Personal Access Token. The attacker published five malicious npm packages under the @asyncapi namespace, which download and execute a multi-stage payload establishing persistence and connecting to C2 infrastructure. The payload targets developer credentials, including browser data, SSH keys, and cloud tokens, and communicates via HTTP, Nostr relays, Ethereum smart contracts, and IPFS. The attack leverages infrastructure and obfuscation techniques linked to the Miasma framework but shows distinct characteristics from prior campaigns.

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Indicators of Compromise 16 extracted

Type Value Detail
IP 85[.]137[.]53[.]71 Details →
Domain ipfs[[.]]io Details →
Domain rentry[[.]]co Details →
SHA-1 22bf76fe317ea6769bd38619bd440e42d119bd6b Details →
SHA-1 a7e18d96efd3cdb127ef4cdcad9e3ad26c482bf2 Details →
SHA-1 9890950adcbc2478e7a080234f053214adbad44e Details →
SHA-1 c70e105e212ff3c1daa04bb2a62507717f296b0b Details →
SHA-1 c8cb3f6d5b90c46686d2bf531dc1a5786e27edc5 Details →
Filename sync.js Details →
Filename validator.js Details →
Filename utils.js Details →
Filename eErrorHandling.js Details →
Filename miasma-monitor.service Details →
Registry User miasma-test-org Details →
GitHub Repo asyncapi/generator Details →
GitHub Repo asyncapi/spec-json-schemas Details →