Malware Families

AdaptixC2 is a open-source post-exploitation and adversarial emulation framework that lets penetration testers control compromised hosts and execute system actions. While being created for red-teaming it is also used by threat actors for attacks.

aka TheTrick, TrickLoader, Trickster

A financial Trojan believed to be a derivative of Dyre: the bot uses very similar code, web injects, and operational tactics. Has multiple modules including VNC and Socks5 Proxy. Uses SSL for C2 communication. - Q4 2016 - Detected in wild Oct 2016 - 1st Report 2017 - Trickbot primarily uses Necurs as vehicle for installs. Jan 2018 - Use XMRIG (Monero) miner Feb 2018 - Theft Bitcoin Mar 2018 - Unfinished ransomware module Q3/4 2018 - Trickbot starts being spread through Emotet. Infection Vector 1. Phish > Link MS Office > Macro Enabled > Downloader > Trickbot 2. Phish > Attached MS Office > Macro Enabled > Downloader > Trickbot 3. Phish > Attached MS Office > Macro enabled > Trickbot installed

aka 1xxbot, ArechClient

SectopRAT, aka ArechClient2, is a .NET RAT with numerous capabilities including multiple stealth functions. Arechclient2 can profile victim systems, steal information such as browser and crypto-wallet data, and launch a hidden secondary desktop to control browser sessions. Additionally, it has several anti-VM and anti-emulator capabilities.

Malware is delivered by emails, containing links to ZIP files or ZIP attachments. The ZIP contains a VBscript that, when executed, downloads additional files from AWS S3, Google Drive or other cloud hosting services. The downloaded files are encrypted .exe and .dll files. The malware targets banking clients in Portugal.

According to Orange Cybwerdefense, NailaoLocker is a ransomware using AES-256-CTR mode, which conveniently logs its encryption activities into a log file.

aka Agenda, Qilin

Ransomware written in Go.

Stealc is an information stealer advertised by its presumed developer Plymouth on Russian-speaking underground forums and sold as a Malware-as-a-Service since January 9, 2023. According to Plymouth's statement, stealc is a non-resident stealer with flexible data collection settings and its development is relied on other prominent stealers: Vidar, Raccoon, Mars and Redline. Stealc is written in C and uses WinAPI functions. It mainly targets date from web browsers, extensions and Desktop application of cryptocurrency wallets, and from other applications (messengers, email clients, etc.). The malware downloads 7 legitimate third-party DLLs to collect sensitive data from web browsers, including sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, mozglue.dll, freebl3.dll, softokn3.dll and msvcp140.dll. It then exfiltrates the collected information file by file to its C2 server using HTTP POST requests.

aka RemcosRAT, Remvio, Socmer

Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers. Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns. Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user. Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity.

Vidar is a forked malware based on Arkei. It seems this stealer is one of the first that is grabbing information on 2FA Software and Tor Browser.

According to Mandiant, STOWAWAY is a publicly available backdoor and proxy. The project supports several types of communication like SSH, socks5. Backdoor component supports upload and download of files, remote shell and basic information gathering.

First introduced in March 2024, ACR Stealer is an information stealer sold as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on Russian-speaking cybercrime forums by a threat actor named "SheldIO". Researchers posit that this malware is an evolved version of the GrMsk Stealer, which likely aligns with the private stealer that SheldIO has been selling since July 2023. The malware, written in C++, is compatible with Windows 7 through 10, and the seller manages all command and control (C2) infrastructure. ACR Stealer can harvest system information, stored credentials, web browser cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and configuration files for various programs. Additionally, it employs the dead drop resolver (DDR) technique to obfuscate the actual C2 infrastructure.

aka Sodin, Sodinokibi

REvil Beta MD5: bed6fc04aeb785815744706239a1f243 SHA1: 3d0649b5f76dbbff9f86b926afbd18ae028946bf SHA256: 3641b09bf6eae22579d4fd5aae420476a134f5948966944189a70afd8032cb45 * Privilege escalation via CVE-2018-8453 (64-bit only) * Rerun with RunAs to elevate privileges * Implements a requirement that if "exp" is set, privilege escalation must be successful for full execution to occur * Implements target whitelisting using GetKetboardLayoutList * Contains debug console logging functionality * Defines the REvil registry root key as SOFTWARE\!test * Includes two variable placeholders in the ransom note: UID & KEY * Terminates processes specified in the "prc" configuration key prior to encryption * Deletes shadow copies and disables recovery * Wipes contents of folders specified in the "wfld" configuration key prior to encryption * Encrypts all non-whitelisted files on fixed drives * Encrypts all non-whitelisted files on network mapped drives if it is running with System-level privileges or can impersonate the security context of explorer.exe * Partially implements a background image setting to display a basic "Image text" message * Sends encrypted system data to a C2 domain via an HTTPS POST request (URI path building is not implemented.) ------------------------------------ REvil 1.00 MD5: 65aa793c000762174b2f86077bdafaea SHA1: 95a21e764ad0c98ea3d034d293aee5511e7c8457 SHA256: f0c60f62ef9ffc044d0b4aeb8cc26b971236f24a2611cb1be09ff4845c3841bc * Adds 32-bit implementation of CVE-2018-8453 exploit * Removes console debug logging * Changes the REvil registry root key to SOFTWARE\recfg * Removes the System/Impersonation success requirement for encrypting network mapped drives * Adds a "wipe" key to the configuration for optional folder wiping * Fully implements the background image setting and leverages values defined in the "img" configuration key * Adds an EXT variable placeholder to the ransom note to support UID, KEY, and EXT * Implements URI path building so encrypted system data is sent to a C2 pseudo-random URL * Fixes the function that returns the victim's username so the correct value is placed in the stats JSON data ------------------------------------ REvil 1.01 MD5: 2abff29b4d87f30f011874b6e98959e9 SHA1: 9d1b61b1cba411ee6d4664ba2561fa59cdb0732c SHA256: a88e2857a2f3922b44247316642f08ba8665185297e3cd958bbd22a83f380feb * Removes the exp/privilege escalation requirement for full execution and encrypts data regardless of privilege level * Makes encryption of network mapped drives optional by adding the "-nolan" argument ------------------------------------ REvil 1.02 MD5: 4af953b20f3a1f165e7cf31d6156c035 SHA1: b859de5ffcb90e4ca8e304d81a4f81e8785bb299 SHA256: 89d80016ff4c6600e8dd8cfad1fa6912af4d21c5457b4e9866d1796939b48dc4 * Enhances whitelisting validation by adding inspection of GetUserDefaultUILanguage and GetSystemDefaultUILanguage * Partially implements "lock file" logic by generating a lock filename based on the first four bytes of the Base64-decoded pk key, appending a .lock file extension, and adding the filename to the list of whitelisted files in the REvil configuration (It does not appear that this value is referenced after it is created and stored in memory. There is no evidence that a lock file is dropped to disk.) * Enhances folder whitelisting logic that take special considerations if the folder is associated with "program files" directories * Hard-codes whitelisting of all direct content within the Program Files or Program Files x86 directories * Hard-codes whitelisting of "sql" subfolders within program files * Encrypts program files sub-folders that does not contain "sql" in the path * Compares other folders to the list of whitelisted folders specified in the REvil configuration to determine if they are whitelisted * Encodes stored strings used for URI building within the binary and decodes them in memory right before use * Introduces a REvil registry root key "sub_key" registry value containing the attacker's public key ------------------------------------ REvil 1.03 MD5: 3cae02306a95564b1fff4ea45a7dfc00 SHA1: 0ce2cae5287a64138d273007b34933362901783d SHA256: 78fa32f179224c46ae81252c841e75ee4e80b57e6b026d0a05bb07d34ec37bbf * Removes lock file logic that was partially implemented in 1.02 * Leverages WMI to continuously monitor for and kill newly launched processes whose names are listed in the prc configuration key (Previous versions performed this action once.) * Encodes stored shellcode * Adds the -path argument: * Does not wipe folders (even if wipe == true) * Does not set desktop background * Does not contact the C2 server (even if net == true) * Encrypts files in the specified folder and drops the ransom note * Changes the REvil registry root key to SOFTWARE\QtProject\OrganizationDefaults * Changes registry key values from --> to: * sub_key --> pvg * pk_key --> sxsP * sk_key --> BDDC8 * 0_key --> f7gVD7 * rnd_ext --> Xu7Nnkd * stat --> sMMnxpgk ------------------------------------ REvil 1.04 MD5: 6e3efb83299d800edf1624ecbc0665e7 SHA1: 0bd22f204c5373f1a22d9a02c59f69f354a2cc0d SHA256: 2ca64feaaf5ab6cf96677fbc2bc0e1995b3bc93472d7af884139aa757240e3f6 * Leverages PowerShell and WMI to delete shadow copies if the victim's operating system is newer than Windows XP (For Windows XP or older, it uses the original command that was executed in all previous REvil versions.) * Removes the folder wipe capability * Changes the REvil registry root key to SOFTWARE\GitForWindows * Changes registry key values from --> to: * pvg --> QPM * sxsP --> cMtS * BDDC8 --> WGg7j * f7gVD7 --> zbhs8h * Xu7Nnkd --> H85TP10 * sMMnxpgk --> GCZg2PXD ------------------------------------ REvil v1.05 MD5: cfefcc2edc5c54c74b76e7d1d29e69b2 SHA1: 7423c57db390def08154b77e2b5e043d92d320c7 SHA256: e430479d1ca03a1bc5414e28f6cdbb301939c4c95547492cdbe27b0a123344ea * Add new 'arn' configuration key that contains a boolean true/false value that controls whether or not to implement persistence. * Implements persistence functionality via registry Run key. Data for value is set to the full path and filename of the currently running executable. The executable is never moved into any 'working directory' such as %AppData% or %TEMP% as part of the persistence setup. The Reg Value used is the hardcoded value of 'lNOWZyAWVv' : * SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\lNOWZyAWVv * Before exiting, REvil sets up its malicious executable to be deleted upon reboot by issuing a call to MoveFileExW and setting the destination to NULL and the flags to 4 (MOVEFILE_DELAY_UNTIL_REBOOT). This breaks persistence however as the target executable specified in the Run key will no longer exist once this is done. * Changes registry key values from --> to: * QPM --> tgE * cMtS --> 8K09 * WGg7j --> xMtNc * zbhs8h --> CTgE4a * H85TP10 --> oE5bZg0 * GCZg2PXD --> DC408Qp4 ------------------------------------ REvil v1.06 MD5: 65ff37973426c09b9ff95f354e62959e SHA1: b53bc09cfbd292af7b3609734a99d101bd24d77e SHA256: 0e37d9d0a7441a98119eb1361a0605042c4db0e8369b54ba26e6ba08d9b62f1e * Updated string decoding function to break existing yara rules. Likely the result of the blog posted by us. * Modified handling of network file encryption. Now explicitly passes every possible "Scope" constant to the WNetOpenEnum function when looking for files to encrypt. It also changed the 'Resource Type" from RESOURCETYPE_DISK to RESOURCETYPE_ANY which will now include things like mapped printers. * Persistence registry value changed from 'lNOWZyAWVv' to 'sNpEShi30R' * Changes registry key values from --> to: * tgE --> 73g * 8K09 --> vTGj * xMtNc --> Q7PZe * CTgE4a --> BuCrIp * oE5bZg0 --> lcZd7OY * DC408Qp4 --> sLF86MWC ------------------------------------ REvil v1.07 MD5: ea4cae3d6d8150215a4d90593a4c30f2 SHA1: 8dcbcbefaedf5675b170af3fd44db93ad864894e SHA256: 6a2bd52a5d68a7250d1de481dcce91a32f54824c1c540f0a040d05f757220cd3 TBD

aka DELIMEAT

Symantec describes this as a malware written as Windows kernel driver, used by China-linked threat actors. The malware has a custom TCP/IP stack and is capable of hijacking connections.

According to Koi Security, this malware harvests NPM, GitHub, and Git credentials for supply chain propagation. It targets 49 different cryptocurrency wallet extensions to drain funds. It uses stolen credentials to compromise additional packages and extensions, spreading the worm further. Furthermore, it deploys SOCKS proxy servers, turning developer machines into criminal infrastructure and installs hidden VNC servers for complete remote access.

Browser information stealer, written in Go.

Honeypot-aware variant of Mirai.

aka Gafgyt, gayfgt, lizkebab +2

Bashlite is a malware family which infects Linux systems in order to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS). Originally it was also known under the name Bashdoor, but this term now refers to the exploit method used by the malware. It has been used to launch attacks of up to 400 Gbps.

aka PlayCrypt

According to PCrisk, PLAY is the name of a ransomware-type program. Malware categorized as such operates by encrypting data and demanding ransoms for the decryption. After we executed a sample of this ransomware on our test machine, it encrypted files and appended their filenames with a ".PLAY" extension. For example, a file titled "1.jpg" appeared as "1.jpg.PLAY", "2.png" as "2.png.PLAY", etc. Once the encryption process was completed, PLAY created a text file named "ReadMe.txt" on the desktop.

Icarus is a modular stealer software, written in .NET. One module is the open source r77 rootkit.

According to the author, Evilginx is a standalone man-in-the-middle attack framework used for phishing login credentials along with session cookies, allowing for the bypass of 2-factor authentication.

aka Destroy RAT, Kaba, Korplug +3

RSA describes PlugX as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) malware family that is around since 2008 and is used as a backdoor to control the victim's machine fully. Once the device is infected, an attacker can remotely execute several kinds of commands on the affected system. Notable features of this malware family are the ability to execute commands on the affected machine to retrieve: machine information capture the screen send keyboard and mouse events keylogging reboot the system manage processes (create, kill and enumerate) manage services (create, start, stop, etc.); and manage Windows registry entries, open a shell, etc. The malware also logs its events in a text log file.

aka POISONPLUG.SHADOW, XShellGhost