DragonForce

In April 2025, the UK Legal Aid Agency (LAA) suffered a cyberattack resulting in the theft of sensitive data spanning nearly five decades, with records dating back to 1978. The breach exposed personal and financial information of legal aid applicants and recipients, including contact details, dates of birth, national ID numbers, criminal history, and payment data. Additionally, legal aid providers' data such as contracts, financial information, and LAA Online Portal credentials were compromised. The agency has confirmed no evidence of exfiltrated data being published, and the UK government is investing over £200 million to modernize digital services and strengthen cybersecurity across public legal aid systems.

DragonForce, a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation, has been observed deploying two backdoors that abuse legitimate infrastructure for command and control (C2) communications. The first backdoor operates in-memory and uses TURN servers, including Microsoft Teams infrastructure, to blend malicious traffic with legitimate traffic. The second backdoor ensures persistence via DLL sideloading and scheduled tasks, using both TURN and MQTT as redundant C2 channels. The malware employs encryption, obfuscation, and in-memory execution to evade detection and maintain access on compromised systems.

SecureList analyzed cyber incidents at Brazilian educational institutions from 2025 to 2026, identifying ransomware attacks and insider threats. Two major ransomware families observed were LockBit 3 and DragonForce, with attackers using leaked LockBit builders and valid credentials for initial access. In one case, LockBit was deployed via PsExec after disabling defenses using a batch script; in another, DragonForce was delivered via AnyDesk. An insider used a custom Python keylogger to capture credentials on shared machines, storing logs in hidden files later retrieved via USB.

The DragonForce ransomware group, tracked by Symantec as Hackledorb, conducted a sophisticated attack against a U.S. services firm, leveraging custom malware and novel techniques to evade detection. The attackers used a Go-based backdoor named Backdoor.Turn, which abuses Microsoft Teams' TURN relay infrastructure to hide command-and-control (C2) traffic behind legitimate Microsoft domains. They also employed DLL sideloading, BYOVD techniques exploiting vulnerable signed drivers—including Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys—and modified system configurations for persistence and lateral movement before deploying the DragonForce ransomware payload.

DevMan, a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation also tracked as Funky Mantis, operates a centralized affiliate portal enabling payload generation, victim management, and payout coordination. The group evolved from affiliations with Qilin, DragonForce, and others, maintaining strong technical similarities to DragonForce ransomware. DevMan promotes attacks on critical infrastructure, including a specialized SCADA-targeting locker designed to cause physical system damage. The operation enforces strict governance over affiliates, uses an 80-20 revenue split, and has claimed 184 victims, primarily in the U.S. across technology, healthcare, and government sectors.

Multiple threat actors are leveraging compromised software supply chains, AI-driven attacks, and unpatched vulnerabilities to deploy malware, steal credentials, and conduct ransomware operations. Notable activities include the exploitation of Citrix Bleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) for DragonForce ransomware deployment, a compromised npm package distributing a Rust-based stealer, and the emergence of HalluSquatting attacks targeting AI coding assistants. Additionally, new backdoors like GigaWiper and RedHook are being used for persistent access and data exfiltration across Windows and Android platforms.