Threat Actors

aka IceFog, Trident, RedFoxtrot +4

Operate since at least 2011, from several locations in China, with members in Korea and Japan as well. Possibly linked to Onion Dog. This threat actor targets government institutions, military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding groups, telecommunications operators, and others, primarily in Japan and South Korea.

aka Spring Dragon, ST Group, DRAGONFISH +7

Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.

aka Vertigo Panda

UNC6384 (also tracked as Vertigo Panda) is a Chinese-affiliated APT that conducts targeted espionage campaigns primarily against diplomatic entities in Southeast Asia and Europe, specifically Belgium and Hungary. The group exploits the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut vulnerability to gain initial code execution via malicious .LNK files, deploying the PlugX RAT through sophisticated delivery mechanisms, including DLL side-loading and adversary-in-the-middle attacks. Their operations involve social engineering tactics, such as spear-phishing emails themed around diplomatic events, to entice victims into executing malicious payloads. UNC6384's use of valid code signing and HTTPS hosting enhances their evasion of detection and increases the likelihood of user interaction.

aka STONE PANDA, Menupass Team, happyyongzi +12

menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.

aka DEEP PANDA, Codoso, WebMasters +12

Adversary group targeting financial, technology, non-profit organisations.

aka BRONZE PRESIDENT, HoneyMyte, Red Lich +9

This threat actor targets nongovernmental organizations using Mongolian-themed lures for espionage purposes. In April 2017, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence observed a previously unattributed actor group with a Chinese nexus targeting a U.S.-based think tank. Further analysis revealed a wider campaign with unique tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This adversary targets non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in general, but uses Mongolian language decoys and themes, suggesting this actor has a specific focus on gathering intelligence on Mongolia. These campaigns involve the use of shared malware like Poison Ivy or PlugX. Recently, Falcon Intelligence observed new activity from MUSTANG PANDA, using a unique infection chain to target likely Mongolia-based victims. This newly observed activity uses a series of redirections and fileless, malicious implementations of legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems. Additionally, MUSTANG PANDA actors reused previously-observed legitimate domains to host files.

aka Labubu

Bearlyfy has been attributed to over 70 cyber attacks targeting Russian companies since its emergence in January 2025, employing a custom Windows ransomware strain known as GenieLocker. The group operates with dual objectives of extortion and sabotage, utilizing a modified version of PolyVice and leveraging vulnerabilities in external services and applications for initial access. Analysis reveals overlaps with PhantomCore, indicating a pro-Ukrainian interest, while Bearlyfy's attacks are characterized by minimal preparation and a focus on immediate impact through data encryption and destruction. Approximately 20% of victims reportedly pay the ransom, with demands escalating to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

aka Red Dev 18, Earth Bluecrow

Since 2021, Red Menshen, a China based threat actor, which has been observed targeting telecommunications providers across the Middle East and Asia, as well as entities in the government, education, and logistics sectors using a custom backdoor referred as BPFDoor. This threat actor uses a variety of tools in its post-exploitation phase. This includes custom variants of the shared tool Mangzamel (including Golang variants), custom variants of Gh0st, and open source tools like Mimikatz and Metasploit to aid in its lateral movement across Windows systems. Also, They have been seen sending commands to BPFDoor victims via Virtual Privat Servers (VPSs) hosted at a well-known provider, and that these VPSs, in turn, are administered via compromised routers based in Taiwan, which the threat actor uses as VPN tunnels. Most Red Menshen activity that has been observed took place between Monday to Friday (with none observed on the weekends), with most communication taking place between 01:00 and 10:00 UTC.131 This pattern suggests a consistent 8 to 9-hour activity window for the threat actor, with realistic probability of it aligning to local working hours.

UNC5342 is a North Korea-linked APT that employs the EtherHiding technique to deliver malware and facilitate cryptocurrency theft. The actor has been observed deploying EtherRAT and JADESNOW malware, utilizing transaction history as a Dead Drop Resolver to embed payloads directly into the calldata of blockchain transactions. Their operations involve leveraging centralized API services to interact with public blockchains like Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain. The malware is designed to exfiltrate sensitive data, particularly targeting cryptocurrency wallets and credentials.

aka Sapphire Sleet

Open-source reporting has claimed that the Hermes ransomware was developed by the North Korean group STARDUST CHOLLIMA (activities of which have been public reported as part of the “Lazarus Group”), because Hermes was executed on a host during the SWIFT compromise of FEIB in October 2017.

aka MASAN, CryptoCore

CryptoCore is a North Korean APT known for targeting cryptocurrency exchanges and financial institutions, employing spear-phishing techniques that lead to LONEJOGGER malware infections. The group has leveraged social engineering tactics, including deepfake technology and hijacked YouTube accounts, to execute sophisticated giveaway scams that deceive victims into sending cryptocurrencies. Their operations have involved the misuse of platforms like Gemini for reconnaissance and the development of fraudulent content. Additionally, CryptoCore has been linked to a variety of campaigns, including Dangerous Password and SnatchCrypto, focusing on financial gain through cryptocurrency theft.

aka G0014

aka Nimbus Manticore

UNC1549 is an Iranian threat actor linked to Tortoiseshell and potentially the IRGC. They have been active since at least June 2022, targeting entities worldwide with a focus on the Middle East. UNC1549 uses spear-phishing and credential harvesting for initial access, deploying custom malware like MINIBIKE and MINIBUS backdoors. They have also been observed using evasion techniques and a tunneler named LIGHTRAIL in their operations.

aka IMPERIAL KITTEN, Yellow Liderc, Imperial Kitten +6

A previously undocumented attack group is using both custom and off-the-shelf malware to target IT providers in Saudi Arabia in what appear to be supply chain attacks with the end goal of compromising the IT providers’ customers. The group, which we are calling Tortoiseshell, has been active since at least July 2018. Symantec has identified a total of 11 organizations hit by the group, the majority of which are based in Saudi Arabia. In at least two organizations, evidence suggests that the attackers gained domain admin-level access.

Sinobi is a financially motivated ransomware group that employs data theft and extortion as primary tactics, operating a public-facing leak portal to pressure victims during ransom negotiations. The group utilizes techniques such as phishing, credential compromise, and exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities for initial access, followed by data exfiltration using tools like RClone. Sinobi ransomware employs Curve-25519 and AES-128-CTR for file encryption, making recovery impossible without the attacker's private key. The group has been linked to significant breaches across various sectors, including automotive, legal, and nonprofit organizations.

TA4922 is a Chinese-speaking cybercrime cluster that employs localized HR, payroll, tax, and invoice lures to deliver various malware families, including Atlas RAT, RomulusLoader, and SilentRunLoader. The actor conducts targeted email campaigns, often impersonating trusted authorities, to facilitate credential phishing and fraud. TA4922's operational tempo is high, with a focus on obtaining remote access for financial gain, and it has shown a rapid evolution in its malware arsenal. The group is also noted for using social engineering to shift communications from email to messaging platforms, enhancing their phishing efforts.

aka Lace Tempest

Lace Tempest, also known as DEV-0950, is a threat actor that exploited vulnerabilities in software such as SysAid and PaperCut to gain unauthorized access to systems. Lace Tempest is known for deploying the Clop ransomware and exfiltrating data from compromised networks.

aka TEMP.Warlock, UNC902

FIN11 is a well-established financial crime group that has recently focused its operations on ransomware and extortion. The group has been active since 2017 and has been tracked under UNC902 and later on as TEMP.Warlok. In some ways, FIN11 is reminiscent of APT1; they are notable not for their sophistication, but for their sheer volume of activity.(FireEye) Mandiant has also responded to numerous FIN11 intrusions, but we’ve only observed the group successfully monetize access in few instances. This could suggest that the actors cast a wide net during their phishing operations, then choose which victims to further exploit based on characteristics such as sector, geolocation or perceived security posture. Recently, FIN11 has deployed CLOP ransomware and threatened to publish exfiltrated data to pressure victims into paying ransom demands. The group’s shifting monetization methods—from point-of-sale (POS) malware in 2018, to ransomware in 2019, and hybrid extortion in 2020—is part of a larger trend in which criminal actors have increasingly focused on post-compromise ransomware deployment and data theft extortion. Notably, FIN11 includes a subset of the activity security researchers call TA505, Graceful Spider, Gold Evergreen, but we do not attribute TA505’s early operations to FIN11 and caution against using the names interchangeably. Attribution of both historic TA505 activity and more recent FIN11 activity is complicated by the actors’ use of criminal service providers. Like most financially motivated actors, FIN11 doesn’t operate in a vacuum. We believe that the group has used services that provide anonymous domain registration, bulletproof hosting, code signing certificates, and private or semi-private malware. Outsourcing work to these criminal service providers likely enables FIN11 to increase the scale and sophistication of their operations.

aka SectorJ04, SectorJ04 Group, GRACEFUL SPIDER +7

TA505, the name given by Proofpoint, has been in the cybercrime business for at least four years. This is the group behind the infamous Dridex banking trojan and Locky ransomware, delivered through malicious email campaigns via Necurs botnet. Other malware associated with TA505 include Philadelphia and GlobeImposter ransomware families.

UNC5291 is a cluster of targeted probing activity that we assess with moderate confidence is associated with UNC3236, also known publicly as Volt Typhoon. Activity for this cluster started in December 2023 focusing on Citrix Netscaler ADC and then shifted to focus on Ivanti Connect Secure devices after details were made public in mid-Jan. 2024. Probing has been observed against the academic, energy, defense, and health sectors, which aligns with past Volt Typhoon interest in critical infrastructure. In Feb. 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released an advisory warning that Volt Typhoon was targeting critical infrastructure and was potentially interested in Ivanti Connect Secure devices for initial access.

aka Mimo

Hezb is a group deploying cryptominers when new exploit are available for public facing vulnerabilities. The name is after the miner process they deploy.

aka Salted Earth, Sturgeon Fisher, ShadowSilk +4

YoroTrooper’s main targets are government or energy organizations in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and other Commonwealth of Independent States, based on Cisco Talos analysis. YoroTrooper was also observed compromising accounts from at least two international organizations: a critical European Union health care agency and the World Intellectual Property Organization. Successful compromises also included Embassies of European countries including Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

aka COLDRIVER, SEABORGIUM, TA446 +7

The Callisto Group is an advanced threat actor whose known targets include military personnel, government officials, think tanks, and journalists in Europe and the South Caucasus. Their primary interest appears to be gathering intelligence related to foreign and security policy in the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus regions.

Redfly hacked a national electricity grid organization in Asia and maintained persistent access to the network for about six months. Researchers discovered evidence for this attack between 28 February and 3 August 2023 after noticing suspicious malware activity within the organization’s network.

aka ZIRCONIUM, JUDGMENT PANDA, BRONZE VINEWOOD +4

FireEye characterizes APT31 as an actor specialized on intellectual property theft, focusing on data and projects that make a particular organization competetive in its field. Based on available data (April 2016), FireEye assesses that APT31 conducts network operations at the behest of the Chinese Government. Also according to Crowdstrike, this adversary is suspected of continuing to target upstream providers (e.g., law firms and managed service providers) to support additional intrusions against high-profile assets. In 2018, CrowdStrike observed this adversary using spear-phishing, URL “web bugs” and scheduled tasks to automate credential harvesting.

The group Microsoft tracks as Storm-2603 is assessed with medium confidence to be a China-based threat actor. Microsoft has not identified links between Storm-2603 and other known Chinese threat actors. Microsoft tracks this threat actor in association with attempts to steal MachineKeys via the on-premises SharePoint vulnerabilities. Although Microsoft has observed this threat actor deploying Warlock and Lockbit ransomware in the past, Microsoft is currently unable to confidently assess the threat actor’s objectives. Additional actors may use these exploits to target unpatched on-premises SharePoint systems, further emphasizing the need for organizations to implement mitigations and security updates immediately.

aka G0096, TA415, Blackfly +17

APT41 is a prolific cyber threat group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity potentially outside of state control.

Trend Micro found that Earth Estries relies heavily on DLL sideloading to load various tools within its arsenal. Aside from the backdoors previously mentioned, this intrusion set also utilizes commonly used remote control tools like Cobalt Strike, PlugX, or Meterpreter stagers interchangeably in various attack stages. These tools come as encrypted payloads loaded by custom loader DLLs.

aka UNC5221, Red Dev 61

While Volexity largely observed the attacker essentially living off the land, they still deployed a handful of malware files and tools during the course of the incident which primarily consisted of webshells, proxy utilities, and file modifications to allow credential harvesting. Once UTA0178 had access into the network via the ICS VPN appliance, their general approach was to pivot from system to system using compromised credentials. They would then further compromise credentials of users on any new system that was breached, and use these credentials to log into additional systems via RDP. Volexity observed the attacker obtaining credentials in a variety of ways.

aka GreedyTaotie, TG-3390, EMISSARY PANDA +13

A China-based actor that targets foreign embassies to collect data on government, defence, and technology sectors.